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I. INTRODUCTION
“You're unbelievably naïve,” said Ultron to Vision. 2
“Well, I was born yesterday,” responded Vision. 3
Intended as a snarky comeback, Vision’s response in the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron
highlights a fundamental difference between artificial intelligence (“AI”) processing and the
functioning of the human mind. As Ultron aptly put it (irony aside), AI are simply naïve. Despite
the trend of anthropomorphizing AI in science fiction, modern AI remain fundamentally different
from human beings.
AI technologies emerged in the early 1950s, and Alan Turing asked his famous question,
“Can machines think?” 4 Only a few years later, in 1956, a presentation at the Dartmouth Summer
Research Project on Artificial Intelligence (“DSRPAI”) coined the term “artificial intelligence”
and introduced what is considered to be one of the first AI programs. 5 The first successful AI
program was likely either Arthur Samuel’s checkers-playing program 6 or Allen Newell, Herbert
Simon, and Cliff Shaw’s automated reasoning program, called Logic Theorist. 7
Initially, development of AI was restricted by computer storage limitations, and AI
development stagnated for a period of decades. 8 Then, in the 1980s, new algorithmic techniques

2

AVENGERS: AGE OF ULTRON (Marvel Studios & Walt Disney Pictures 2015).

3

Id.

4

A. M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 49 MIND 433, 433 (1950). Turing proposed the “imitation
game” in his paper contemplating whether or not machines could think.
5

Rockwell Anyoha, The History of Artificial Intelligence, HARV. U. SITN BLOG: SPECIAL EDITION ON ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2017/history-artificial-intelligence/.
6

See Arthur L. Samuel, Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers, 3 IBM J. OF RES. & DEV.
210 (1959).
7

See Leo Gugerty, Newell and Simon’s Logic Theorist: Historical Background and Impact on Cognitive Modeling,
50 PROC. OF THE HUM. FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOC’Y ANN. MEETING 880 (2006).
8

See Anyoha, supra note 5.

1

sparked a resurgence in AI. 9 Among these techniques were “deep learning” and “expert
systems.” 10 In 1997, IBM’s Deep Blue defeated world champion Garry Kasparov in a chess
match 11—an enormous leap from the very first chess-playing AI only fifty years earlier. Recent
rapid growth in both computer processing power and data storage and acquisition has led to the
current AI boom of the Digital Age. 12
AI have become ubiquitous in many industries. We encounter numerous implementations
of AI in our daily lives—from friendly, voice-activated personal assistants like Siri and Alexa, to
Facebook’s powerful facial recognition and targeted advertisements. 13 AI is also used widely in
the technology, banking, and marketing industries. 14 These AI are exceptionally useful for the
limited tasks that they are programmed to accomplish.
For example, Facebook has used an AI tool called DeepFace to learn to recognize people
in photos that users upload. 15 Facebook claimed the application’s most advanced image
recognition tool was as successful as humans, or even slightly more so, at recognizing the same
people in different images. 16 Another potentially more troubling example comes from the French
company, Cloem, which has developed algorithms based on patent law best practices and brute
force techniques to compile patent claim permutations generated from a set of keywords and a

9

See id.

10

See id.

11

William Saletan, Chess Bump: The Triumphant Teamwork of Humans and Computers, SLATE (May 11, 2007),
https://slate.com/technology/2007/05/the-triumphant-teamwork-of-humans-and-computers.html.
12

See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WIPO TECHNOLOGY TRENDS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
(2019).
13

See Karen Hao, What is Machine Learning?, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/11/17/103781/what-is-machine-learning-we-drew-you-another-flowchart/.
14

See Anyoha, supra note 5.

15

Yaniv Taigman, Ming Yang, & Marc’ Aurelio Ranzato, DEEPFACE: CLOSING THE GAP TO HUMAN-LEVEL
PERFORMANCE IN FACE VERIFICATION (2014).
16

See id.

2

seed patent claim by altering the word-choice and making other grammatical variations. 17 Even
more recently, IBM’s “Miss Debater” AI debated live against debate champion Harish Natarajan. 18
Miss Debater crafted its case on the topic of subsidizing preschools by scanning billions of existing
sentences from a document library and strategically aggregating the sentences into a surprisingly
coherent argument. 19
At the structural level, modern AI techniques are generally focused within the subset of
machine learning algorithms, including neural networks and deep learning. 20 Machine learning
algorithms discern patterns from data, and deep learning techniques amplify this effect by utilizing
multiple layers of computational nodes to sift through data and find patterns. 21 Machine learning
techniques can be further categorized into three subcategories: supervised learning, unsupervised
learning, and reinforcement learning, with supervised learning being the most prevalent
technique. 22 Another system of classifying AI that is used more generally by those in technological
fields refers to Artificial Narrow Intelligence (“ANI”), Artificial General Intelligence (“AGI”),
and Artificial Superintelligence (“ASI”). 23 All existing AI currently fall into the category of ANI—
no existing AI (not even the most complex deep learning algorithm) is capable of learning,
perceiving, understanding, and functioning on the level of humans. 24

17

CLOEM, https://www.cloem.com/flat/technology/ (last visited April 16, 2020). The beta system touts that users can
“play with infinity in a few steps.”
18

Sigal Samuel, An AI System Competed Against a Human Debate Champion. Here’s What Happened. Here’s what
happened, VOX (Feb. 12, 2019) https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/2/12/18222392/artificial-intelligencedebate-ibm-san-francisco.
19

See id.

20

See Hao, supra note 13.

21

See id.

22

See id.

23

Naveen Joshi, 7 Types of Artificial Intelligence, FORBES (Jun. 19, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/06/19/7-types-of-artificial-intelligence/#5660adfa233e.
24

Id.

3

The increasing prevalence of AI in so many industries raises real concerns about the legal
implications of AI. Intellectual property law, and particularly patent law, is one field in which
these concerns have been raised. In fact, AI is already a familiar topic to many patent attorneys,
and the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) estimated that nearly 340,000 AIrelated patent applications have been filed as of 2019. 25 Coinciding with the increasing prevalence
of AI, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) also recently published a request
for comments on the intersection between intellectual property rights and AI. 26
On April 27, 2020 the UPSTO published a long-awaited decision declining to extend patent
inventorship to an AI, based on the statutory plain meaning and case law defining the requirements
for proper inventorship. 27 Prior to the April USPTO decision, one commentator criticized that the
U.S. had not yet addressed the question of whether or not AI could be recognized as an inventor
on a patent, despite the likely use of AI in the development of numerous currently granted
patents. 28 Given the likelihood that AI were already widely used in the development of patented
inventions, the validity of AI inventorship was a question that desperately needed resolution, and
the USPTO got it exactly right in answering with a resounding “no.”
The act of invention under U.S. patent law has traditionally required both “conception” and
“reduction to practice” as a means of identifying the proper inventor of the patented invention. 29
As AI become more powerful, it is unclear whether or not AI could eventually be deemed to have

25

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, supra note 12.

26

U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, PTO-C-2019-0029, Request for Comments of Patenting Artificial Intelligence
Inventions (Aug. 27, 2019).
27

U.S. Patent Application No. US16/524,350 (filed July 29, 2019) (Decision on Petition Apr. 27, 2020).

28

Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV.
1079, 1083 (2016) (“[M]achines have been autonomously generating patentable results for at least twenty years”).
29

MPEP § 2138 (9th ed. 2018).
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“conceived” of an inventive idea. However, our understanding of the functioning of the human
brain has also changed significantly due to technological advances and has revealed stark
differences between human and AI processing, so the legal definition of “conception” as it relates
to patent inventorship should reflect that understanding.
This paper argues that the “conception” element of patent inventorship is necessarily a
human neurological process and it is vital to the functioning of the U.S. patent system because of
the underlying policy of incentivizing inventiveness. Thus, AI processing, regardless of relative
efficiency compared to humans, cannot amount to “conception,” as defined by U.S. patent law, so
AI cannot and should not be recognized as inventors under U.S. patent law. As such, this paper
provides a deeper rationale to support the USPTO decision denying inventorship recognition for
an AI. This paper does not intend to determine whether or not AI could be granted legal
personhood; decide if AI should have any other roles in the U.S. patent system; or elaborate on AI
as patentable subject matter. These questions will require close analysis of the applicable sections
of the U.S. patent laws and relevant case law, and, ultimately, it will likely fall to Congress to
address whether or not AI will ever be recognized through legal personhood. Rather, this paper
posits that the patent law requirement that an inventor must have conceived of the claimed subject
matter in a patent application is connected to the incentivization scheme of the U.S. patent system
and, therefore, inherently a human quality.
This paper is divided into four parts. The introduction is Part I. Part II provides an overview
of patent inventorship and the definition of “conception” as a requirement for inventorship. Part
III illustrates the rationale for excluding AI from being recognized as inventors under the
conception requirement with an example case, analogy to other limitations on intellectual property
rights for non-human entities, and an overview of human cognitive neuroscience compared to the

5

characteristics of modern AI. Part III also recognizes problems that might arise under this analysis
and provides a possible avenue for resolution. In conclusion, this paper summarizes the modern
requirement of “conception” for proper inventorship as an inherently human mental activity, which
excludes AI.

II. PATENT INVENTORSHIP: WHO IS AN INVENTOR AND WHAT IS CONCEPTION?
A. Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution (the “Intellectual Property Clause”) grants
to Congress the enumerated power "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." 30 Thus, Congress has the sole discretion to create a patent system, and Congress
has delegated the power to issue patents to the USPTO. However, it remains a constitutional
requirement that the patent system is tied to inventors. Therefore, the terms used in the Intellectual
Property Clause itself, including “inventor,” are subject to constitutional interpretation, and it is
important to consider the original understanding of these terms in defining patent rights.

B. Constitutional Definition of “Inventor”
The Intellectual Property Clause is “unique in that it is the only one of the Enumerated
Powers where the drafters mandated ‘a specific mode of accomplishing the particular authority
granted,’” so the specific reference to “inventors” and their “discoveries” is significant. 31 In an

30

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

31

Brief of Appellants at 46, MadStad Eng'g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(No. 2013-1511), 2013 WL 5536452 (quoting Figueroa v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 139, 149 (2005), aff'd, 466 F.3d
1023 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).

6

effort to ascertain the meaning of constitutional terms, legal scholars have looked to contemporary
sources, such as Samuel Johnson’s dictionary. 32 There, “inventor” is defined as “[o]ne who
produces something new; a deviser of something not known before.” 33 Mirroring the verbs
“devise” and “produce” in this definition indicates that the “produc[tion of] something new” must
stem from the mind of the inventor, so an inventor is someone who thinks of and thereafter creates
novel subject matter. This is the person whom Congress has the discretion to recognize with the
patent exclusive rights. 34

C. A Patent Must List the Proper Inventor
Under the U.S. patent laws, patent rights vest initially in the inventor. 35 Specifically, § 101
of the Patent Act states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefor . . . .” 36 The plain language of § 101, in accordance with the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution, makes it clear that only an inventor may obtain a patent; therefore,
inventorship is inherently a condition for patentability. 37

32

SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).

33

Id.

34

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent exclusive rights referred to in the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution are often shorthanded as a “monopoly.”
35

Id. See, e.g., Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602 (1868) ("He is the inventor and is entitled to the
patent who first brought the machine to perfection and made it capable of useful operation. . . . No one is entitled to
a patent for that which he did not invent unless he can show a legal title to the same from the inventor or by
operation of law . . . ."); 41 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1824)( “[T]he right of the inventor [is] the fruit of his mind—it
belongs to him more than any other property—he does not inherit it—he takes it by no man's gift—it peculiarly
belongs to him, and he ought to be protected in the enjoyment of it.”).
36

35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).

37

See id.; see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

7

Prior to enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (“AIA”) 38, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(f) set forth an explicit inventorship requirement for priority in the “first-to-invent” patent
system: “A person shall be entitled to a patent unless he did not himself invent the subject matter
sought to be patented.” 39 Although this explicit inventorship requirement was eliminated with the
AIA and the shift to a “first-inventor-to-file” system, a patent will still be determined to be invalid
if an actual inventor is not named. 40 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”)
published by the USPTO defines rejections based on both § 101 and § 115 for incorrect
inventorship of applications filed on or after September 16, 2012. 41 To date, neither the Supreme
Court nor the Federal Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of the “first-inventor-to-file”
system 42, though one commentator suggests that the new rules for priority are not inconsistent with
the framers’ views on the purpose of the U.S. patent system. 43 Regardless of any decision on
priority, it remains a constitutional requirement that patents are granted to inventors. 44
The proper inventor for a patent can either be a single human (sole inventorship) or multiple
humans (joint inventorship). 45 “Inventor” is defined as “the individual or, if a joint invention, the

38

Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).

39

35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (amended 2011).

40

See 35 U.S.C. § 115(a) (2012); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is also notable that if inventorship were no
longer important under the AIA, it would not have made sense to refer to the system as “first-inventor-to-file.”
41
MPEP § 2137.01 (9th ed. 2018); id. at § 2157 (“Although the AIA eliminated pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102(f), the
patent laws still require the naming of the actual inventor or joint inventors of the claimed subject matter.”)
42

See MadStad Eng'g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 8:12-cv-1589-T-23MAP, 2013 WL 3155280
(M.D. Fla. May 8, 2013), aff'd, 756 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 153 S.Ct. 1398 (U.S. Feb. 23, 2015)
(No. 14-366) (affirming dismissal for lack of standing but declining to reach the question of constitutionality of the
“first-inventor-to-file” system).

43

See generally Alexander J. Kasner, The Original Meaning of Constitutional Inventors: Resolving the Unanswered
Question of the Madstad Litigation, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2015).
44

See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

45

DONALD CHISUM, 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.04 (2020).

8

individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.” 46
Defining “an inventor” so broadly as “an individual” seems to leave open the question of whether
or not AI could be an inventor. However, although many statutes define “person” to include
abstract entities such as corporations and societies, in addition to individual people 47, that is not
the case with the term “individual” as used in the patent statutes because corporations cannot be
inventors. 48 Additionally, the act of invention for purposes of U.S. patent law has developed to
require two related elements, conception and reduction to practice, the first of which excludes AI.

D. Conception
i. A Mental Act
Conception is the mental formulation by the inventor of a complete inventive idea. 49
Donald Chisum describes that the modern concept of “conception” developed from two decisions
by the Commissioner of Patents Leggett in 1871. 50 In the first of these cases, Edison v. Foote &
Randall, the Commissioner relied on the idea of conception to decide an interference over the
invention of an adapted telegraph printing lever. 51 There, Edison relied upon the date he
successfully constructed the instrument as the date of invention, but Foote and Randall relied upon
an earlier date corresponding to a sketch made by Foote, which experts testified they could have

46

35 U.S.C. § 100(f) (2012).

47

1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“[T]he words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals . . . .”).
48

See, e.g., MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 602 F.3d 1306, 1310 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2010); New
Idea Farm. Equip. Corp. v. Sperry Corp., 916 F.2d 1561, 1566 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
49

CHISUM, supra note 45 at § 10.04.

50

Id. at § 10.04(1)(a).

51

Id. (citing Edison v. Foote, 1871 C.D. 80 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)).

9

translated into a working model. 52 The Commissioner awarded priority to Foote and Randall and
stated that “[i]nvention is not the work of the hands, but of the brain. The man that first conceived
the complete idea by representing it on paper, or by clear and undisputed oral explanation, is the
first inventor . . . .” 53 Edison v. Foote & Randall therefore distinguished conception as a mental
act, rather than a physical act.
In Cameron & Everett v. Brick, the Commissioner further defined the mental act of
conception between two extremes: construction of a working model and “the idea struck out—the
brilliant thought obtained—the great improvement in embryo.” 54 The Commissioner struck a
balance between these extremes and defined conception as the point in time “when the ‘embryo’
has taken some definite form in mind and seeks deliverance, and when this is evidenced by such
description or illustration as to demonstrate its completeness.” 55 Though decided in the context of
priority of invention, these early decisions by the Patent Office consistently recognized the mental
element of conception as superior to the physical element of constructing the invention. 56
In Smith v. Nichols, the U.S. Supreme Court solidified the importance of conception over
any physical act of creation. 57 In the opinion, Justice Swayne declared that “A patentable invention
is a mental result. It must be new and shown to be of practical utility. Everything within the domain

52

Id.

53

Id. (quoting Edison v. Foote, 1871 C.D. 80, 81 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)) (emphasis added).

54

Id. (quoting Cameron v. Brick, 1871 C.D. 89, 90 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)).

55

Id. (quoting Cameron v. Brick, 1871 C.D. 89, 90 (Comm’r Pat. 1871)) (emphasis added).

56
See also Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1875) (“Mechanical skill is one thing: invention is a
different thing. Perfection of workmanship, however much it may increase the convenience, extend the use, or
diminish expense, is not patentable. The distinction between mechanical skill, with its conveniences and advantages
and inventive genius, is recognized in all the cases.”).
57

See Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112 (1874).

10

of the conception belongs to him who conceived it. The machine, process, or product is but its
material reflex and embodiment.” 58
In 1897, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia decided the leading case
Mergenthaler v. Scudder. 59 There, Mergenthaler relied upon constructive reduction to practice at
the time of filing his patent applications as the date of invention in an interference proceeding, and
Scudder attempted to establish prior invention of the same linotype machine with earlier evidence
of conception. The Mergenthaler court reversed in favor of Mergenthaler and refined the definition
of conception in relation to completeness:
The conception of the invention consists in the complete performance of the mental
part of the inventive act. All that remains to be accomplished, in order to perfect
the act or instrument, belongs to the department of construction, not invention. It is
therefore the formation, in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent
idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in
practice, that constitutes an available conception, within the meaning of the patent
law. 60
The Mergenthaler definition of conception has been widely adopted by the courts, and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has used this definition of conception since its establishment in
1982. 61

58

Id. at 118 (emphasis added).

59

Mergenthaler v. Scudder, 11 App. D.C. 264 (D.C. Cir. 1897).

Id. at 276 (citing W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 375 (1890)) (first emphasis
added).
60

61

CHISUM, supra note 45 at § 10.04(1)(c). See, e.g., Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed. Cir.1994)
(“Conception is complete only when the idea is so clearly defined in the inventor's mind that only ordinary skill
would be necessary to reduce the invention to practice, without extensive research or experimentation.”); Hybritech
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir.1986) (“Conception is ‘the formation in the
mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to
be applied in practice.’”) (first citing W. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 532 (1890),
then citing Coleman v. Dines, 754 F.2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir.1985)).

11

Additionally, because the date of conception could dominate over the date of reduction to
practice if the inventor continued to work with reasonable diligence after conception 62, the mental
act of conception is the most important characteristic of invention, not the physical act of reduction
to practice. In fact, actual reduction to practice was never required for a valid patent application 63,
which leaves only the mental act of conception as an absolute requirement to define the inventive
act.
Although most cases on conception predate the AIA, and often concerned determining a
precise date of invention, those cases remain important because they define the act of invention,
which remains a constitutional requirement. By focusing on the act of conception, with reduction
to practice being of secondary consideration, patent law has long highlighted the mental aspects
of inventive activity.
When these early cases were decided and conception was defined as a mental act, that
mental act almost certainly only referred to human mental processes. It would not have been
necessary at the time to define “mental act” any further because the idea of machines with humanlike intelligence was only barely conceivable, even in science fiction. The earliest example of AI
in fiction may be Samuel Butler’s Erewhon, published in 1872, which explores Butler’s premise
that machines might develop consciousness. 64 However, this premise was presented in a satirical

62

Mergenthaler, 11 App. D.C. at 276 (“‘He who first conceives and gives expression to the idea of an invention in
such clear and intelligible manner that a person skilled in the business could construct the thing, is entitled to a
patent, provided he uses reasonable diligence in perfecting it.’”) (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v.
Minneapolis Harvester Works, 42 F. 152, 157 (C.C.D. Minn. 1890)).
63

MPEP § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2018). Reduction to practice could be either actual or constructive, and the simple filing
of the patent application was sufficient to establish both conception and constructive reduction to practice of the
subject matter claimed in the application. Id. The inventor did not need to show evidence of actual reduction to
practice when relying on the content of the patent application. Id. See also Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
64

SAMUEL BUTLER, EREWHON (1872).

12

view of Victorian society and certainly not widely viewed as realistic. AI was not technologically
realized until the mid-twentieth century. 65

ii. Connecting Conception to Inventorship: Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
Despite its basis in cases related to priority of invention, the meaning of “conception” is
also closely linked to other issues, including inventorship. Determining priority of invention based
on the date of conception is the corollary of determining the proper inventor based on who
conceived of the invention. Furthermore, conception is described as “the touchstone of
inventorship.” 66
In the leading case Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., the Federal Circuit
decided an issue of proper joint inventorship based on conception. 67 There, Barr Laboratories
(“Barr”) sought FDA approval to manufacture and market a generic version of the drug 3’azidothymidine (“AZT”) by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”). 68 Burroughs
Wellcome (“Burroughs”) commenced a patent infringement suit against Barr after it was notified
of the ANDA. 69 Barr conceded that its AZT product would infringe Burroughs’ patents; however,
Barr filed a counterclaim under 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1988) seeking to correct inventorship of
Burroughs’ patents to add two NIH employees as coinventors—Barr had obtained a license to
manufacture and sell AZT from the government, which would be the owner of the NIH

65

See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.

66

Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship, the
completion of the mental part of invention.”).
67

See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

68

Id. at 1226.

69

Id.
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coinventors’ interests in Burroughs’ patents. 70 Barr argued that the invention was not conceived
in a sufficiently complete form until Burroughs received the results from tests conducted by the
NIH. 71
A panel of the Federal Circuit held that the inventors listed by Burroughs successfully
claimed conception prior to the purported NIH coinventors for five of Burroughs’ patents because
their conception was corroborated by a draft patent application dated prior to any of the
experiments conducted by the NIH. 72 The panel clarified that “[The] document is not itself a
conception, for conception occurs in the inventors' minds, not on paper. The draft simply
corroborates the claim that they had formulated a definite and permanent idea of the inventions by
the time it was prepared.” 73 Furthermore, the purported NIH coinventors merely participated in
the normal course of clinical trials for the drug. 74 The panel held that the NIH employees were not
joint inventors of Burroughs’ inventions. 75 Thus, the Burroughs court looked to evidence of
conception to determine whether or not individuals could be properly joined as coinventors, in
addition to determining priority of invention.
The Federal Circuit addressed conception in terms of patent inventorship again in 2003 in
Board of Education v. American Bioscience, Inc. 76 In the Board of Education v. American
Bioscience, Inc. case, a panel of the Federal Circuit applied the definition of conception in the
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context of chemical inventions to determine whether or not an individual contributed to the
conception of the patented compound and could be recognized as an inventor. 77 The panel held
that an individual could not be properly recognized as a joint inventor of a chemical compound
simply for “having in mind specific portions of a claimed compound” rather than the final
compound “with all its components.” 78
A proper inventor is the human who has conceived of the invention. Because of the
significant connection between conception and inventorship 79, conception case law will remain
relevant for patent applications governed by the AIA “first-inventor-to-file” priority system. 80 The
Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the question of inventorship for a patent filed under the AIA,
but because the proper inventor must still be listed on every patent application 81, it is highly likely
that proper inventorship (and joint inventorship) will still be determined based on conception.
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This leaves the critical inquiry of whether or not AI can satisfy the conception requirement
and be listed as inventors on patent applications. As the subsequent discussion will demonstrate,
it is clear that AI cannot satisfy the conception requirement.

iii. Policy of Incentivizing Inventors’ Ingenuity
The policy considerations that are vital to the existence of the U.S. patent system serve as
further evidence that conception is the critical element of the act of invention and, therefore,
proper patent inventorship. The framers of the Constitution largely took the position that the
patent system should function as an economic trade between inventors and the public. 82 Thomas
Jefferson is viewed as one of the foundational architects of the U.S. patent system, and he was of
the opinion that “patents were meant as ‘encouragement to men to pursue ideas, which may
produce utility.’” 83 Moreover, numerous legal scholars have recognized this view of the policy
underlying the U.S. patent system as more persuasive than other property rights justifications. 84
It is unlikely that AI could ever be incentivized in the way that human inventors are
incentivized (e.g., monetarily or with industry recognition and stature) and issuing patents that
are not incentive-driven could lead to vast over-privatization of inventions. 85 More is certainly
not always better, particularly when the means to achieving more is to flout decades of
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THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)) (emphasis added).
84
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inventorship precedent and sound policy. In the words of Thomas Jefferson himself, it is man’s
“ideas” which are to be encouraged. 86 As will be addressed in greater detail below, modern AI
do not conceive of “ideas,” so to speak, and cannot be incentivized to conceive of ideas, thus,
participation by AI in the U.S. patent system would not comport with the primary policy goals of
the system itself.

III. AI CANNOT SATISFY THE CONCEPTION REQUIREMENT OF PATENT INVENTORSHIP
A. DABUS: An Example Case
So far, there have not been many patents filed listing an AI inventor, but one highly
publicized example provides an illustration of how the issue will be treated in both the United
States and European patent systems. Dr. Stephen L. Thaler developed an AI called “Device for
Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience” (“DABUS”) and filed patent applications on
two inventions allegedly created autonomously by DABUS. 87 The two patent applications, one for
a fractal food container and one for an attention-attracting beacon (the “DABUS applications”),
each listed DABUS as the sole inventor. 88 Dr. Thaler included himself as the legal representative
for DABUS and the assignee of the DABUS applications. 89 The DABUS applications were filed
with the USPTO and multiple international patent offices, including the European Patent Office
(“EPO”) and the United Kingdom Intellectual Property Office (“UKIPO”). 90 The USPTO as well
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as both the EPO and UKIPO all refused the DABUS applications on the grounds that an AI cannot
be an inventor. 91
On April 27, 2020 the USPTO published its decision on the DABUS applications in
response to a petition to vacate a Notice to File Missing Parts of Nonprovisional Application (the
“Notice”). 92 The issued Notice indicated that the DABUS applications did not identify the
inventor. 93 The USPTO denied the petition and refused to recognize DABUS as an inventor based
on the plain language of the patent statutes and Federal Circuit “conception” precedent requiring
a patent inventor be a natural person. 94
By late November of 2019, the EPO had similarly declined to extend inventorship to
DABUS after oral proceedings for the European counterparts of the DABUS applications. 95 There,
the EPO denied inventorship recognition to DABUS by recognizing the European patent system’s
scheme of moral rights of inventors and summarizing that the inventor designated on a patent
application must be a human being, not a machine. 96 The UKIPO took a very similar approach in
its December 2019 decision. 97 The moral rights scheme is somewhat different from some of the
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economically motivated policies that dictate recognition of inventors in the U.S. patent system;
however, counsel for Dr. Thaler argued that AI would continue to invent even without
incentivization. 98 This logic sounds like an admission that “inventing” is an automatic, preprogrammed process for DABUS—it does not sound like conceiving of an inventive idea. Despite
Dr. Thaler’s optimistic view of DABUS, DABUS is still limited by the training inputs it receives
and the underlying architecture of its software and hardware, just like any other AI.

B. Analogous Limitations of IP Rights for Other Non-Human Entities
i. Corporations Cannot Be Inventors
As further evidence of the view that inventorship requires human conception, consider the
jurisprudence on the issue of whether non-human entities can be inventors. For example,
corporations are barred from being recognized as inventors on patent applications, and, instead,
corporations participate in the patent system as assignees. 99 Instead, corporations participate in the
patent system as assignees.
Part of the reasoning for excluding corporations from inventorship recognition is the idea
that a corporation cannot conceive of an invention because a corporation has no collective
consciousness to perform the required mental act. For example, in z4 Technologies, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., accused infringer Microsoft alleged, inter alia, in support of its defense of prior
invention, that it “corporately both conceived and reduced to practice.” 100 A panel of the Federal

98
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Circuit noted that “[t]he district court expressed reservations concerning the propriety of asserting
corporate conception, but it expressly declined to decide this issue . . . . Because we agree that this
instruction was not relevant, we need not and do not address the merits of Microsoft's claims
regarding corporate conception.” 101 As such, the Federal Circuit indicated in dicta a concern about
recognizing non-human inventorship or inventorship arising from alternatives to conception in an
individual human mind. 102
Further, the example of barring corporations illustrates a connection to the underlying
social goals of the U.S. patent system. Commentators describe that initial patent rights vest in
human inventors rather than abstract entities like corporations as a way of incentivizing human
ingenuity separately and in exchange for the economic benefit of the invention. 103 The link
between conception and the economic reward of patenting is critical to the patentability inquiry.
However, corporations have no ingenuity to incentivize. In the same manner, AI processing
cannot be simply substituted for human ingenuity as doing so would break the connection
between the initial node of ingenuity and the ultimate economic benefit that is conferred by the
patent system. It is insufficient to argue that AI might be able to produce inventions entirely
without incentivization because the U.S. patent system presumes that inventive ingenuity must
be incentivized in order to occur. 104
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ii. Animals as Other Non-Human Entities and Comparison to Copyright Law
Further bolstering the foregoing analysis is how the U.S. Copyright Office treats nonhuman authors. Though copyright law is distinct from patent law in many ways, each of these
systems arises from the same clause of the Constitution 105, and it can be useful to analogize
between the two intellectual property systems at a broad level.
Under U.S. copyright law, an author is the creator of a work of original expression. 106
Eligible works of authorship can include literary works, musical works, architectural works, and
photographs, among others. 107 In the notorious case, Naruto v. Slater, a six-year-old, “highly
intelligent,” crested macaque named Naruto picked up David John Slater’s camera and took
multiple “selfies.” 108 The complaint in Naruto alleged that a book published containing the
“selfies” violated Naruto’s copyright. 109 The court disagreed and held that it would be an
“extraordinary step” unsupported by the Copyright Act to extend copyright authorship to a nonhuman. 110
The Naruto case indicates that the courts are leery of giving legal recognition to non-human
forms of consciousness without explicit legislative intent. On the topic of other forms of
consciousness, Charles Darwin described the difference between the minds of man and animals as
“one of degree and not of kind.” 111 In contrast, AI is different in both degree and kind: in degree,
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the processing ability of AI may be greater than that of humans in limited situations, but, in kind,
AI lacks grounding in common sense and thousands of years of evolution. The courts should follow
Naruto and refrain from sneaking AI into the patent system under the standard of conception when
the patent system has always presupposed that inventions develop from a human mental act.
The U.S. Copyright Office has taken a comparatively more proactive stance on preventing
the intrusion of AI into the protection for creative works. Well before the April 2020 USPTO
decision to not recognize AI as inventors, copyright law expressly excluded automatically
generated works that are produced without input from a human author. 112 As such, the recent
USPTO decision is consistent with copyright law in that it reasserts a bright-line rule barring nonhuman inventorship.

C. Scientific Perspectives
i. Uniqueness of the Human Mind
While neuroscience may generally be an unfamiliar topic in the courts, Justice Breyer has
long advocated for legal decisions to be more rigorously informed by scientific developments
because “[s]cientific issues permeate the law.” 113 Cognitive neuroscience is notoriously one of the
more opaque fields within the broad category of human biology, and we are far from having a
complete understanding of the human brain, but modern neuroscience techniques still highlight
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just how truly unique the functioning of the human brain really is, particularly in comparison to
AI.
Human brains contain something on the order of 100 billion neurons—the cells that form
the building blocks of the human nervous system. A biological neuron typically consists of a cell
nucleus, which receives input from other neurons at input terminals called dendrites, and an axon
which transmits chemical signals from the cell nucleus as outputs across synapses to other neurons.
However, the range in brain sizes throughout the animal kingdom suggests that the uniqueness of
the human brain is found in something more than just the sheer number of its component parts. 114
Despite a significant lack of clarity in the field of cognitive neuroscience, neuroimaging
studies—particularly functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) techniques—have begun
to uncover the neural processes that give rise to human creativity and innovation. 115 A recent study
used fMRI techniques to identify and model a brain network associated with human creative
activities, which indicated that there may be a specific neuronal connectivity profile that
characterizes human creativity. 116
One aspect of the human nervous system that is quite different from artificial neural
networks is that our nervous system responds to both internal and external (to the body) stimuli. 117
Though artificial neural networks contain similar component parts to biological neurons, artificial
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neural networks simply do not replicate this sort of dynamic complexity. In fact, due to their
relative simplicity, artificial neural networks are typically used in neuroscientific research models
to learn more about the human brain and its specific pathways but not to replicate it. 118
From an evolutionary perspective, it has been suggested that the uniqueness of human
cognitive abilities emerged as a set of social skills under cooperative and prosocial evolutionary
motivations. 119 Phylogenetic comparisons to our closest biological relatives indicate that specific
social pressures probably triggered the evolution of human cognition. 120 Other species may have
some similar cognitive traits, but human cognition on the whole is unparalleled. 121
Thus, faithfully replicating human cognition would likely require finding a means of
accurately reproducing the social conditions under which our species evolved. Without this
understanding, any artificial model of human cognition is just guessing and checking with little
hope of actually replicating. The law should not tolerate the bald assertion that AI could potentially
replicate human cognition because it is unsubstantiated by the weight of cognitive neuroscience
and evolutionary anthropology.

ii. Characteristics of Modern AI
It is easy to think of AI as conscious beings, and the trend of anthropomorphizing AI in
fiction has been around for over a century, but allowing those anthropomorphic characterizations
to spill over into our understanding of modern AI technologies is misleading at best and generally
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just incorrect. Somewhat unfortunately, this trend has only been exacerbated by the explosive
popularity of “neural networks” as a machine learning technique. The name originated from the
biological organization of neurons and synapses 122, though no neural network is anywhere near a
faithful replication of the human brain. Furthermore, because the neuroscience of human creativity
is far from fully understood, it can be easy to assume that AI are more similar to humans than is
true in reality. David Watson of the Alan Turing Institute opines that “[b]y anthropomorphizing a
statistical model, we implicitly grant it a degree of agency that not only overstates its true abilities,
but robs us of our own autonomy.” 123
Watson is particularly critical of neural networks for three main reasons: (1) they are easy
to fool; (2) they are extremely data inefficient; and (3) they are “myopic” or, in other words, nearsighted. 124 These deficiencies are all noted with respect to human cognition. Artificial neural
networks only “learn” by assessing an outcome and modifying the system’s “weights” so that the
weights are gradually shifted in the direction that increases performance of the specified tasks. 125
Other experts hypothesized that “the alleged myopia problem is just a byproduct of the requirement
that [neural networks] select a label from a constrained choice set.” 126 But this illustrates exactly
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the reason that AI processing is not equivalent to human cognition. AI are limited by their inputs
and the tasks they are programmed to accomplish.
In other words, AI are constrained by the inputs from developers, or at least by the biases
imparted by the developer into the code that constitutes the AI. Because of the inherent biases in
AI code, the creation of AI is different from the genetic transmission of traits from one human to
her offspring—it is not a wholly objective process, and an AI would to some degree always reflect
the choices of the developer who programmed it. 127 Humans, by contrast, are the products of
thousands of years of evolution. AI are the immediate product of the individual developers who
wrote their code.
Admittedly, a mere biological requirement for intelligence would be a poor test because,
theoretically, computers could be created from organic materials and, in fact, the preliminary
components of such a biological computer have already been created. 128 However, Abbot agrees
that “[i]n the event that policymakers decide computers should not be inventors, a rule explicitly
barring nonhuman inventorship would be a better way to achieve that result.” 129 A bright-line rule
distinguishing human inventorship from non-human (including AI) activities is the most durable
approach. This approach prevents the courts from having to wade through opaque factual
determinations of whether or not a particular AI’s algorithmic architecture constitutes a
sufficiently equivalent “mind” on a case by case basis.
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D. Possible Consequence of Excluding AI from Patent Inventorship
Although excluding AI from patent inventorship is consistent with conception case law
and the technological realities of modern AI, one possible consequence of excluding AI from
inventorship recognition under the conception rationale can be termed the “no inventor scenario.”
For some and possibly most modern AI, the individual or individuals who developed the AI’s
programming can probably be recognized as the inventors of any subject matter produced through
functioning of the AI—so long as the developers can meet the Mergenthaler standard of
conception (i.e., the formation in their minds of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention). However, the concern is that, as AI become more complex—for example
with the implementation of deep learning—developers may never know precisely what an AI’s
algorithms are doing to reach a particular result, and the result might be subject matter far removed
from anything the developers ever contemplated, so such developers would not be able to meet the
Mergenthaler conception standard. If the AI cannot be listed as the inventor on a patent application
for that subject matter, and the developers cannot be listed either, then there is no proper
inventor. 130
Some commentators suggest that this scenario indicates that the patent system should only
be narrowly concerned with the result of invention, not the human mental act that has traditionally
taken place, in order to adequately encourage AI development. 131 This illustrates the tension
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caused by significant industry movement toward broad implementations of AI. However, this
result is not inconsistent with the conception framework of inventorship upon which the courts
have relied since the nineteenth century and the policy of incentivizing human ingenuity that the
framers cemented as the cornerstone of the U.S. patent system. Because AI are non-human by
definition, and therefore AI can neither “conceive” of subject matter nor be incentivized to do so,
AI are never proper inventors and any subject matter derived wholly from AI processing is
unpatentable.
The courts could potentially resolve this issue by carving out an exception to the
Mergenthaler standard of conception for developers of AI, such that the developer of an AI is
always the default inventor of any subject matter created by the AI, regardless of whether or not
the developer has a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, but such
a decision would be inconsistent with decades of inventorship precedent. An unprecedented
exception like this could lead to a slippery slope of arguments ad absurdum regarding the
inventorship status of inventors’ progeny or even their acquaintances—if an AI’s output is its
developer’s invention in spite of conception case law to the contrary, then what about subject
matter created by the developer’s biological children, and what about the subject matter created
by the students the developer taught? A better solution would be to allow Congress to address the
issue directly by statute. Congress can decide if AI are important enough for social progress that a
unique exception in patent law should be made. Until then, only humans can be listed as inventors
on patents.

IV. RECOMMENDED OUTCOME
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Conception is the foundational requirement for invention in the U.S. patent system.
Furthermore, conception is the earliest discernable nexus between the act of invention and the
economic benefits conferred by the patent system. Sooner or later, a case challenging joint
inventorship on a patent governed by the AIA will make it to the Federal Circuit. The Federal
Circuit should explicitly adopt the conception standard articulated in Mergenthaler as the
requirement for proper inventorship for patent cases originating under the AIA.
In doing so, AI should be excluded from being recognized as inventors on patent
applications because modern AI processing is distinct from the human mental act of conception.
Furthermore, AI processing breaks down the requisite nexus between human ingenuity and the
economic benefits that are granted to patent holders. In order to prevent a complete breakdown of
the legal framework of patent inventorship, inventorship must be limited to humans. If we ever
find ourselves in a world where an AI can supersede its programming and autonomously request
to be listed as an inventor, we have far more pressing problems to worry about.
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